Approved For Release 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030004-7

CON. THINTIAL

197860

US/BP/42 April 7, 1960 25X1A9A

UNITED STATES DELEGATION to the

CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT Geneva, Switzerland March 15, 1960

TO:

Mr. Eaton

FROM:

Robert E. Matteson

SUBJECT:

Suggestion Re Disarmament Initiative at Summit

In accordance with your request, the following is submitted:

Text of Draft Cable

The following is a suggestion for your consideration in the event it is decided that some affirmative proposal should be put forward by our side at the Summit:

- l. If the Soviet have not come off of their present position by April 29th, the suggestion is that the President should consider taking the following initiative on the first day of the Summit meeting in behalf of the 5 powers. He would ask Khrushchev to agree to a directive to the 10 Nation Conference to proceed to an agreement on the principles of the necessary disarmament and control steps for each of the 3 stages of a disarmament agreement culminating in total national military disarmament (to get away from "general and complete disarmament") -- including the elimination of bases, nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles, etc., all under effective control and without a time limit.
- 2. This would have these differences from the Soviet position: (a) there would be no time limit on completion of the 3 stages; (b) each disarmament step would be taken only under effective controls satisfactory to each party; (c) there would be no automatic transition from the 2nd to

COMPTDENTIAL

Approved For Belease 2005/07/20 : CIA-RDP80R01441R000100030004-7

CCNFIDENTIAL -2-

3rd stages; (d) the measures in the first and second stages would correspond (with some amendments) to the Western plan; (e) after the agreement on the principles of each of the 3 stages, the 10 nations would work out the concrete measures of the 1st stage and proceed to implement them while working out the concrete measures of the 2nd stage, etc.

3. Such an initiative by the President at the Summit would have these advantages: (a) calling the Soviet propaganda bluff and moving them to the discussion of concrete measures in a first stage; (b) giving the US the big initiative at the Summit -- as was done with "open skies" in 1955; (c) reversing our possible public opinion losses on "general and complete disarmament" and showing the world we are champions of total national disarmament as well as of effective control; (d) giving the Soviet and the world further evidence of our willingness to meet the Soviet half-way on coming to grips with the question we have both called the most important; (e) promoting a further relaxation of tension which could be as much or more in our interest as in the Soviet's.